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The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was a vio-
lation of the Lanham Act because the Oscar was a
strong mark which should be given the strongest
possible protection against infringement, the
awards were strikingly similar, the parties both
distributed similar goods in similar channels, the
evidence showed actual confusion, and the intent of
Creative House was to deceive the public with its
award.1
California unfair competition claims are substan-
tially similar to federal trademark infringement
claims under the Lanham Act.16 To prove unlawful
dilution under California law, the Academy only
needed to show that its business reputation is likely
to be injured or that the distinctive value of the
Oscar is likely to be diluted.' 7 The court held the
Oscar's value lies in its distinctive design and sym-
bol of film excellence and the Star Award dilutes
this value because it could be distributed without
regard to the ultimate recipient or could look
shoddy and cheap. 8
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the
Oscar is entitled to copyright protection and re-
manded to allow the Academy to present evidence
of copyright infringement. The public confusion
among the two awards violated both the Lanham
Act and California unfair competition laws. The
Ninth Circuit remanded the California unfair com-
petition claim with instructions to the district court
to reinstatethe claim.19 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the Academy's claim under the Califor-
nia anti-dilution statute with instructions to the
district court to reinstate the claim.20 0
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Introduction
As the Defendants here learned, "[elvery genuine
work of art has as much reason for being as the
earth and the sun."' In this case, the California
Court of Appeals interpreted the California Art
Preservation Act (the Act)2 which prohibits an
owner or possessor of fine art, other than its creator,
from altering or destroying the work. Plaintiff art-
ists painted a mural on the wall of a Shell service
station, and Shell later destroyed the mural. The
court held that although the statute did not explic-
itly include murals, the legislature intended the
term 'Tree art" to include Plaintiffs' mural.
Facts
In 1980, Shell Oil Company hired several artists to
paint a large mural on the wall of a Shell service
station. With full artistic freedom, the artists cre-
ated a 1200 square foot mural entitled "Filling Up
On Ancient Energies," depicting Hispanic themes,
dinosaurs, Mayan deities, and motor vehicles. In
1988, Shell ordered the destruction of the mural's
wall to make room for a parking lot. Without notice
to the plaintiffs, the mural was destroyed except for
a 120 square foot portion. Although disputed by the
parties, Plaintiffs assert the mural was executed so
that it could be removed from the wall without
damaging the wall or the mural.
Plaintiffs sued the Defendants in September 1988,
seeking monetary damages under the Act. The trial
court, in adjudicating cross motions for summary
judgment, granted Defendants' motion. Although
finding that the mural was indeed removable from
the wall on which it was painted, the court con-
cluded that a mural was not included in the term
"fine art" under the Act, and therefore it was unpro-
tected. Plaintiffs appealed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The California Legislature determined that the
physical alteration or destruction of fine art is
detrimental to an artist's reputation.3 The Legisla-
ture also asserted that artists have an interest in
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protecting their works, and recognized a public
interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations. 4
The Act defines 'Tme art" as "an original painting,
sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in
glass, of recognized quality" other than a work
contracted for commercial use.5 Owners or posses-
sors of art, other than the artist, cannot destroy or
authorize the destruction of the art.6 If the Act is
violated, an artist may receive actual and punitive
damages, attorney fees, and expert witness fees. 7
The rights of the artist are descendible, transfer-
able, and endure until 50 years after the artist's
death.8
The art at issue here is attached to a building, and
the Act specifically addresses this particular dis-
play of art. An artist's rights are waived if the art
cannot be removed from the building without dam-
age to the art or the building.9 If the art at issue can
be removed from the building without damage, the
owner must try to notify the artist, who has 90 days
to remove the work at his or her own expense.' 0
Faced with an issue of statutory construction, the
California Appellate Court independently reviewed
the lower court decision. The court considered the
legislative intent "to effectuate the purpose of the
law." If a statute's language is unambiguous, intent
is ascertained from the plain meaning of the lan-
guage itself. In application, however, the court said
it reached a "tautological result." The dictionary
definition of mural is "a painting or other work
applied to and made integral with a wall surface."
A painting is defined as a "decoration achieved by
applying paint to a surface."" The court determined
that a mural is a subset of painting, "[miuch as rose
is to flower, or ring to jewelry, or sonnet is topoetry."i
Interestingly, a recent clarification of the legisla-
tive intent helped the court in adjudicating this
case. The Legislature had construed the Act after
its enactment in relation to the threatened destruc-
tion of David Hockney's mural in the Hollywood
Roosevelt Hotel. A California law required that
every public swimming pool wall have a white
finish. The Legislature, in an uncodified general
law, specifically exempted Hockney's mural on the
hotel's swimming pool wall from the regulation.
Based on these findings by the Legislature, the
court here held that the law-making body had in-
tended to protect murals under the Act.
The defendants argue, however, that the term
painting is ambiguous in the statute because an-
other California law, the Government Code provi-
sion concerning state financing of art in public
buildings, makes separate reference to painting
and mural.13 Therefore, the defendants conclude, if
the Legislature had intended the Act to include
murals, it would have specifically named them. The
appellate court held that the use of "painting" in the
government code was used comprehensively.
Merely because the Legislature uses a term in a
limited sense in one statute does not indicate it
intended the same limitation to apply to the same
term used in another law. The court held that the
separate uses of the same term was not determina-
tive here, and that the intent of the statute to
protect the artist's reputation, articulated in the
Act itself, did not support the defendants' argu-
ment.
Finally, the defendants argued that to include a
mural in the Act would be so burdensome to the
owner as to render the Act unconstitutional. The
court summarily dismissed this unsupported argu-
ment, refusing to rewrite the statute. The court, in
looking at the declaration of legislative intent,
found that it would be a distortion of the Act to hold
that an artist who created a mural, endowing it
with artistic expression, is not protected. The Act
differentiates between fine art that is removable
from a building and that which is not.14 Defendants
argue that the Act is limited to sculpture and glass.
The court refused to limit the statute to exclude the
obvious application, the mural, pointing out that a
mural is the ' most obvious form of fine art that may
be attached to a building."
Conclusion
The court held that the Legislature intended the
term "fine art" to include murals, a subset of paint-
ings. The case was remanded for further proceed-
ings. 9
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